

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 PM-07

H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01

SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14

OIC-04 OMB-01 AECE-00 EB-11 DRC-01 /172 W

----- 008638

P R 061530Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1865

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 1997

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: BELGIAN

PLENARY PRESENTATION #3 ON STABILIZING

MEASURES

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

FOLLOWING IS THE AGREED TEXT ON STABILIZING MEASURES

APPROVED BY AHG ON 6 MARCH 1974 FOR PRESENTATION BY

THE BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE AT THE 7 MARCH PLENARY.

STATEMENT WILL BE DELIVERED IN FRENCH. BEGIN TEXT.

1. IN PREVIOUS PRESENTATIONS, MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE
EXPLAINED THE GENERAL PURPOSES OF STABILIZING MEASURES.

WE HAVE SHOWN WHAT THEY WOULD DO AND HOW THEY WOULD

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WORK. AND WE HAVE ALREADY MADE CERTAIN SPECIFIC PROPOSALS.

2. IN OUR DISCUSSION OF THESE MEASURES, WE HAVE MADE TWO MAJOR POINTS. FIRST, WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT AN APPROPRIATE PACKAGE OF PROPERLY DESIGNED STABILIZING MEASURES WOULD GREATLY ENHANCE THE CONTRIBUTION THAT AGREED REDUCTIONS CAN MAKE TO STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. WE HAVE DESCRIBED HOW THE MEASURES WOULD SERVE TO REDUCE AMBIGUITIES INHERENT IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GROUND FORCES OF EACH SIDE, AS PERCEIVED BY THE OTHER, AND HOW THIS IN TURN WOULD DIMINISH THE POSSIBILITY OF SURPRISE ATTACK. MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WOULD BE ENHANCED. THIS WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE ONCE AGREED REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN IMPLEMENTED, BECAUSE THERE WOULD THEN BE FEWER FORCES AVAILABLE ON EITHER SIDE FOR DEFENSE. THEREFORE, THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGREEMENT ON STABILIZING MEASURES OF THE TYPE WE HAVE PROPOSED WOULD BE A CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY BECAUSE IT WOULD IN ITSELF HELP TO DETER AGGRESSION.

3. WE HAVE CALLED ATTENTION TO A SECOND MAJOR POINT. THE STABILIZING MEASURES WE PROPOSE WOULD RESOLVE SOME PRACTICAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES. THESE PROBLEMS WOULD ARISE FOR BOTH SIDES, AND THEIR SOLUTION THROUGH AGREED MEASURES AS PART OF AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS WOULD CLEARLY BE IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST.

4. AS MY COLLEAGUES HAVE INDICATED ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, THE MEASURES WE HAVE PROPOSED ARE DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED NOT ONLY WITH REDUCTIONS, BUT WITH EACH OTHER. THEY COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER. THUS, THEIR CONTRIBUTION CAN BEST BE APPRECIATED WHEN THEY ARE SEEN AS A PACKAGE. FOR THIS REASON, BEFORE TURNING TO A MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE REMAINING TWO OF THE FOUR MEASURES WE HAVE PROPOSED, I WISH TO REVIEW BRIEFLY THE MAIN POINTS OF SUBSTANCE PRESENTED BY MY CANADIAN COLLEAGUE ON FEBRUARY 28.

5. AGREEMENT TO REDUCE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE WOULD NATURALLY ENTAIL ESTABLISHING CONFIDENTIAL

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CEILINGS ON THE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES REMAINING IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THUS, AGREEMENT TO RESPECT THE LEVELS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES ESTABLISHED THROUGH AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS WOULD BE NEEDED. IN OTHER WORDS, THE US AND USSR WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO EXCEED THE FORCE LEVELS IN THE AREA WHICH WOULD RESULT WHEN AGREED REDUCTIONS ARE DEDUCTED FROM CURRENT FORCE LEVELS.

6. THIS, IN TURN, WOULD REQUIRE LIMITATIONS ON THE ENTRY OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES INTO THE AREA. BUT TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEED OF BOTH THE US AND USSR TO REPLACE, ROTATE AND EXERCISE THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA, THERE WOULD BE SPECIFICALLY LIMITED EXCEPTIONS TO RESIDUAL US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE LEVELS.

7. ONCE THIS IS AGREED, THE PARTIES WILL WISH TO HAVE A FLOW OF INFORMATION TO ASSURE THEM THAT THE NEW US AND SOVIET FORCE LEVELS, AS WELL AS THE AGREE EXCEPTIONS TO THEM, ARE BEING RESPECTED. TO MEET THIS NEED, THE PARTIES SHOULD AGREE ON NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING ROTATIONS.

8. THE EXISTENCE OF CEILINGS ON THE LEVELS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA, TOGETHER WITH THE LIMITATIONS ON ENTRY OF ADDITIONAL US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES, WILL INCREASE THE NEED OF EACH SIDE TO ASSURE ITSELF AS TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THOSE US AND SOVIET FORCES REMAINING IN THE AREA. TO MEET THIS COMMON NEED, THE PARTIES SHOULD AGREE ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

9. MR. CHAIRMAN, I WISH NOW TO DISCUSS IN GREATER DETAIL THE REMAINING TWO OF THE FOUR MEASURES TABLED BY MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE ON DECEMBER 11. THESE MEASURES ARE, FIRST, LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE, NUMBER AND DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY US AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND, SECOND, EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES BY US AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA

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OF REDUCTIONS.

10. AS I HAVE ALREADY INDICATED, MY COLLEAGUES AND I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A GENERAL RECOGNITION THAT AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD REQUIRE A LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES REMAINING IN THE AREA, AND LIMITATIONS ON THE ENTRY OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES INTO THE AREA. AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF SUCH LIMITATIONS, BOTH SIDES WILL HAVE AN EVEN STRONGER INTEREST THAN BEFORE IN ELIMINATING TO THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE EXTENT SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INSTABILITY IN THE AREA. IT IS NOT ONLY THE FACT THAT LARGE US AND SOVIET FORCES ARE FACING EACH OTHER IN THE AREA THAT IS OF CONCERN. THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE FORCES CAN ALSO CREATE FEARS AND UNCERTAINTIES.

CONCERN TENDS TO ARISE IN PARTICULAR FROM LARGE MILITARY
EXERCISES IN WHICH THEY TAKE PART. BOTH SIDES
HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN PREVENTING EXCESSIVE INTENSITY
OF MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM CREATING INSTABILITY IN THE
AREA. EXERCISES ON A LARGE SCALE COULD ALSO CREATE
CONCERN, MISUNDERSTANDING, AND THEREFORE INSTABILITY
BECAUSE OF THE OBJECTIVE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MIGHT BE
PREPARATION FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK. AN ACCUMULATION OF
EXERCISES IN RAPID SUCCESSION OR OF EXERCISES OVERLAPPING
EACH OTHER IN TIME COULD ALSO HAVE THIS EFFECT. IT IS FOR THESE
REASONS THAT WE PROPOSE TO LIMIT THE SI
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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AECE-00 AEC-11 EB-11

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RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 OMB-01 DRC-01 /172 W
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P R 061530Z MAR 74
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

12. UNDER OUR PROPOSAL, US AND SOVIET MAJOR EXERCISES,
AS JUST DEFINED, COULD NOT EXCEED 50,000 GROUND FORCE
PERSONNEL IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AT ANY ONE TIME.
FURTHERMORE THEY WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN A MULTI-
NATIONAL EXERCISE IN WHICH US OR SOVIET PARTICIPATION
MET THE CRITERIA FOR A MAJOR EXERCISE IF THE TOTAL
GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE ENTIRE EXERCISE
EXCEEDED 50,000 IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AT ANY ONE TIME.

13. THE US AND USSR WOULD UNDERTAKE TO LIMIT THE
FREQUENCY AND DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY CONDUCTING
NO MORE THAN ONE MAJOR EXERCISE AT A TIME, AND NO MORE
THAN SIX MAJOR EXERCISES IN A YEAR. THEY WOULD ALSO
UNDERTAKE NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN MAJOR EXERCISES LASTING
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LONGER THAN SIXTY DAYS OR SCHEDULE TWO MAJOR EXERCISES
WITH LESS THAN A 30-DAY INTERVAL BETWEEN THE CONCLUSION
OF THE FIRST ONE AND THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND ONE.
THE COMBINATION OF SUCH LIMITATIONS ON THE FREQUENCY AND
DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES WOULD, APART FROM THEIR
GENERAL STABILIZING EFFECT, HELP TO MAKE THE REQUIREMENT
FOR PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR EXERCISES AND THE LIMITATIONS
ON THEIR SIZE FULLY EFFECTIVE.

14. WE ALSO PROPOSE THAT THE US AND USSR UNDERTAKE TO
LIMIT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF THEIR GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL
IN NORMAL GROUND TRAINING AREAS, INCLUDING THOSE ENROUTE
TO AND FROM THEM, TO 50,000 AT ANY ONE TIME. THESE GROUND
TRAINING AREAS WOULD BE THOSE NOW DEVOTED TO MILITARY
TRAINING AND WOULD BE LISTED AND DEFINED IN THE AGREEMENT.

15. THE LIMITATIONS WE ARE PROPOSING ON THE SIZE, FREQUENCY
AND DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES, AS WELL AS ON THE NUMBER OF
GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL IN NORMAL TRAINING AREAS TO BE DEFINED
IN THE AGREEMENT, ARE REASONABLE AND WE BELIEVE THEY WOULD
PERMIT THE CONTINUATION OF ADEQUATE TRAINING OF FORCES ON
BOTH SIDES.

16. WE HAVE ALSO PROPOSED AN EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR
EXERCISES. DIRECT OBSERVATION OF EXERCISES ON A RECIPROCAL,
MUTUALLY AGREED BASIS, WOULD HELP TO REDUCE AMBIGUITIES OCCASIONED
BY MAJOR EXERCISES. THE PRESENCE OF OBSERVERS WOULD CONTRIBUTE
GREATLY TO A FEELING OF CONFIDENCE ON BOTH SIDES ABOUT THE
NATURE AND PURPOSE OF MILITARY EXERCISES. IT WOULD ALSO SERVE
AS ASSURANCE THAT THE EXERCISES CONCERNED WERE CARRIED OUT
WITHIN THE AGREED LIMITATIONS. THEREFORE, THIS MEASURE WOULD
MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY.

17. WE PROPOSE, ACCORDINGLY, THAT THE US AND USSR UNDERTAKE
TO INVITE OBSERVERS TO THE GROUND PHASES OF ALL MAJOR EXERCISES,
AS WE HAVE DEFINED THEM. A PARTY INVITED TO OBSERVE WOULD
BE PERMITTED TO SEND UP TO THREE OBSERVERS TOGETHER WITH UP
TO SIX SUPPORT PERSONNEL TO EACH EXERCISE. THE INVITING
COUNTRY WOULD DESIGNATE A REPRESENTATIVE TO HANDLE ARRANGE-
MENTS FOR SUCH OBSERVERS.

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18. IN THIS AND THE TWO PRECEDING PRESENTATIONS, MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE SOUGHT TO DEVELOP TWO MAIN THEMES. ONE HAS BEEN THE CONTRIBUTION WHICH STABILIZING MEASURES, IN ASSOCIATION WITH REDUCTIONS, WOULD MAKE TO THE STABILITY AND SECURITY WHICH ARE OUR AGREED OBJECTIVES. THE OTHER HAS BEEN THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING, THROUGH THESE MEASURES, PRACTICAL PROBLEMS ARISING FOR BOTH SIDES OUT OF FIRST-PHASE REDUCTIONS. BY PROVIDING FOR AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON IMPORTANT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND BY REGULATING THE DIMENSIONS OF THESE ACTIVITIES, THESE MEASURES WOULD PROMOTE STABILITY AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WITHOUT PREVENTING THE US AND USSR FROM CONTINUING APPROPRIATE REPLACEMENT, ROTATION AND EXERCISE OF THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THUS THESE MEASURES WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE OBJECTIVES OF BOTH SIDES.
END TEXT.HUMES

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NATIONAL SECURITY, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, MEETING REPORTS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, MILITARY EXERCISES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 MAR 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974VIENNA01997
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740362/aaaacgcp.tel
Line Count: 295
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 25 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <25 MAR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <02 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: BELGIAN PLENARY PRESENTATION #3 ON STABILIZING
TAGS: PARM, XG, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005